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Available online 4 November 2010Abstract Venture Capital (VC) has emerged as the dominant source of finance for entrepre-
neurial and early stage businesses, and the Indian VC industry in particular has clocked the fast-
est growth rate globally. Academic literature reveals that VC funded companies show superior
performance to non VC funded companies. However, given that venture capitalists (VCs) select
and fund only the best companies, how much credit can they take for the performance of the
companies they fund? Do the inherent characteristics of the firm result in superior performance
or do VCs contribute to the performance of the portfolio company after they have entered the
firm? A panel that comprised VCs, an entrepreneur and an academic debated these and other
research questions on the inter-relationships between VC funding and portfolio firm perfor-
mance. Most empirical literature indicates that the value addition effect dominates the selec-
tion effect in accounting for the superior performance of VC funded companies. The panel
discussion indicates that the context as well as the experience of the General Partners in the
VC firms can influence the way VCs contribute to the efficiency of their portfolio companies.
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doi:10.1016/j.iimb.2010.10.009received VC funding at one point or the other. Some of the
companies in India that received VC funding include Polaris,
Biocon, Sasken, Shoppers’ Stop, and Landmark. VC backed
firms contribute to the economy through the creation of
jobs, an exceptional growth rate, their heavy investments,
and their international expansion (Romain & Potterie, 2004).
The proportion of companies that receive VC funding,
however, is very small. Kaplan and Lerner (2010) indicate
that only 1/6th of 1% of new businesses manage to obtain
VC funding. Despite the small proportion of companies that
receive VC funding, there has been a growth in the avail-
ability of VC over the years in the different economies. In
the US, which is by far the leader in VC investments by a big
margin, the availability of VC funding has been stable with
respect to the stock markets. From 2005 to 2008, annual
commitments to VC ran in the range of $25e$33 billion. The
historical average (since 1980) of VC commitments in the
US, measured as a fraction of the total market value of
equity, was 0.138%. Since 2002, however, the commitments
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Similarly, the historical average of the VC investments as
a fraction of total stock market value was 0.164%, and the
average since 2002 is 0.155% (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010). If we
factor the growth in the economy and the stock market
over the years, we can infer that the availability of VC
funding has steadily increased over the years.
By contrast, the growth of VC in India has been more
recent. The amount invested increased from $1.4 billion in
2004 to $22 billion in 2007, before reducing to $8.1 billion in
2008 (Thillai Rajan & Deshmukh, 2009). The VC investments
in India grew at a CAGR of 47% during 2004e08, which is one
of the highest growth rates in the world. By contrast, the
investments in the US grew only at the rate of 6% during the
same period. VC investments in India as a percentage of
GDP grew from a mere 0.4% of GDP in 2004 to more than
1.5% of GDP in 2008, whereas VC investment in the US as
a percentage of GDP is relatively constant and hovers
around 0.7%e0.8% of GDP.
This part of the paper provides an academic perspective
on how venture capitalists (VCs) contribute to the portfolio
companies that they have invested in. The rest of the
academic perspective is structured as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of VC investment. VC has several
features that distinguish it from other sources of financing.
The differences between VC and bank financing, a prom-
inent source of financing for businesses, are also highlighted.
Section 3 discusses the performance of VC funded and non
VC funded companies. Examining whether VC funded
companies show superior performance as compared to non
VC funded companies, this section summarises the findings
from some well known comparative studies on VC funded
and non VC funded companies. Section 4 discusses the
reasons behind the superior performance of VC companies.
Two main ideas are explored in the academic perspective
viz., whether the better performance can be attributed to
better screening and selection of investment opportunities
or because of managerial inputs and value addition provided
by VCs after investment. Section 5 provides a summary and
identifies some areas where more research is needed.Overview of venture capital investment
The VC investment cycle consists of four phases, namely,
fund raising, selection and investment, monitoring, and
exit. In the fund raising phase, VC firms (commonly known
as general partners or GPs) raise capital from various
investors (commonly known as limited partners or LPs) such
as financial institutions, corporations, university endow-
ments, family offices, and wealthy individuals. Generally,
the VC funds have a close ended structure and have a fund
life of around 10e12 years. During the fund raising process,
the VC firms clearly state the investment objectives and
other features of the fund structure such as the fund life,
fund management fees, etc. The funds can have a sector
focus (say technology, biotechnology, etc.) or stage focus
(say growth stage, late stage, etc.) or both. Established VC
firms usually have more than one fund under their
management at any time.
During the selection and investment phase, the VC firms
evaluate various investment opportunities to deploy thefunds raised. Since the companies that VC firms invest
in are private companies, they rely on their proprietary
networks to source deals. They use various screening
and selection criteria to identify suitable investment
opportunities. Once a VC firm has identified an investment,
the VC firm and the investee company go through several
rounds of complicated deal making to negotiate the valu-
ation as well as the structure of the investment. The
investment process is complete after the VC firm ‘writes
the cheque’ in favour of the investee company. In most
cases, VCs invest in the company through multiple funding
rounds, since staging of capital infusions allows VCs to
gather information, monitor the progress of firms, and gives
the option of abandoning those projects that are not doing
well (Gompers, 1995).
Themonitoring phase is the time interval between date of
investment and exit of the VC investor. During this phase, the
VC works closely with the investee firm. VCs generally get
board seats and depending on the need, add value to the
investment by providing various managerial inputs. Apart
from providing capital, VCs use their specific industrial
knowledge, expertise, and contacts to assist their portfolio
firms in various areas such as strategic and operational
planning, personnel and supplier selection, marketing,
financing, and even assume managerial roles where neces-
sary (MacMillan, Kulow, & Khoylian, 1989).
During the exit phase, the VC firms realise returns on
their investments in the portfolio company, and return the
capital to the investors in the fund. Since VC funds are
generally structured as close ended funds, the VCs have to
liquidate their investments after a certain period and
cannot hold on to them forever. The common routes of exit
are the initial public offering (IPO) or an acquisition.
While VC is not a major source of capital for small
businesses, the two are often linked closely in the public
mind (Winton & Yerramilli, 2008). Using data from the
National Survey of Small Business Finances, Berger and
Udell (1998) find that commercial bank loans provide 19%
of all financing for small businesses, whereas VC invest-
ments provide only 2%. Davis (2003) indicates that 90% of
startups are not supported by VC and more than 95% of
small firm financing comes from sources other than VC,
particularly commercial banks. The prominence for VC
investments, despite being quantitatively lower than bank
financing could be due to the growth in VC funding.
According to Ueda (2002), indicators of bank lending to
small firms were constant or even fell after 1977, whereas
VC investment was 100 times larger in 2001 than it was in
1977. Table 1 compares the features of VC and bank
financing on various parameters. While there are some
similarities, there are several differences. Mainly, VC
investment differs from that made by the banks, or for that
matter from any other source, in the extent of involvement
in the portfolio company after the investment.Performance of VC and non VC funded
companies
With more and more companies getting VC funding,
researchers started to look at the impact of VC on the
performance of the investee companies. While before-after
Table 1 Venture capital and bank financing.
Venture capital Bank financing
Similarities
Monitoring Given the high risk of failure in small businesses, both
forms of investors monitor borrowers
Use of
covenants
Both forms use covenants to restrict the actions of the
owner and provide additional levers of control when
the firm performs poorly
Differences
Industries Concentrated primarily in a few industries such as software,
telecommunications and biotechnology
Widely used across
industries
Nature of firms
invested in
Very risky and skewed return distributions, with a
high probability of weak or negative returns and a small
probability of extremely high returns
A wide variety of firms
Form of
investment
Equity and equity related instruments such as convertible
debt and convertible
preference equity
Debt
Quantum of
investment
Median investment of $4.5 million at each stage of investment Loans to small businesses
are usually less than $1 million
Extent of
monitoring
More frequently than banks. It has been estimated that VCs
visit their portfolio companies an average of 18.7 times per year
Most bank loans to smaller
firms are monitored once
or twice a year. The risky
loans might be monitored more
frequently
Control rights Often hold board seats in the portfolio company, having
voting rights in excess of their cash flow rights and contractual
right to replace the entrepreneur if covenants are violated
Monitor for covenant violations
and exercise control by
threatening to force default
and possible liquidation
Ownership
rights
Takes ownership in the firm in which investment has been
made, leading to a dilution of the owner shareholding
No shareholding or ownership
in the firm
Post investment
behaviour
Active and provide managerial inputs to portfolio firms Passive
Return
expectations
Have very high required rates of return. Depending on the stage of
investment, expect to earn annual returns of 25%e50%
Returns are more conservative,
and in line with the prevailing
interest rates in the economy
Source: Winton & Yerramilli, 2008; Sahlman, 1990; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2001; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Blackwell & Winters, 1997; de
Bettignies & Brander, 2007; Morris, 1987; Gartner, 1988
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on the performance of the company, the most compelling
evidence on the contribution of VC investment came from
comparative studies of VC and non VC backed companies.
Many studies have used the IPO and associated data to
compare the performance of VC backed and non VC backed
firms. One of the earliest studies that compared VC backed
and non VC backed firms was published by Megginson and
Weiss (1991). The study indicates that VC backed IPOs are
associated with higher underwriter prestige, higher insti-
tutional holdings, and lower levels of under pricing than
non VC backed IPOs. The presence of VC in the issuing firm
lowers the total costs of going public and maximises the net
proceeds to the issuing firm. Jain and Kini (1995) find that
VC backed firms show superior post IPO operating perfor-
mance than non VC backed companies. Brav and Gompers
(1997) find that VC backed firms have higher long term
returns.
Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2009) indicate that
VC backed firms have higher sales as compared to non VC
backed firms before VC funding, and after funding showa greater growth in sales. The total production costs of VC
backed firms are higher as compared to non VC backed firms
before funding, and the growth in these costs subsequent to
financing is also greater for VC backed firms. They also find
that while growth in the level of employment remains
comparable across the two kinds of firms, salaries and
wages grew more in VC backed firms after receiving
financing.
In an oft-cited paper, Hellmann and Puri (2000) show
that VC funded companies are more forthcoming in intro-
ducing new products to the market. They pursue more
aggressive market strategies than non VC backed firms, and
also aim at more radical innovations. In another study
published around the same time, Kortum and Lerner (2000)
also point out that VC funded firms are more innovative and
are associated with more valuable patents.
While very few companies receive funding, a large
fraction of the startups that make it to the public company
stage are funded with venture capital. By taking into
account only true startup companies that go public, Kaplan
and Lerner (2010) find that from 1999 to 2009, 60% of the
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the 11 years did the figure go down to less than 50%. Since
the proportion of companies that receive funding is very
low, the authors go on to infer that VC funding and going
public are highly related. They interpret that VC funding
significantly increases the success of a startup going public.
Explaining the performance differential
Research on the comparative performance of VC and
non VC funded companies indicates that by and large VC
funded companies have shown superior performance. More
recently, the contributions of the VC investor to the supe-
rior performance of VC funded companies has attracted
a lot of research interest. The two major activities of VCs
are screening and selection of the companies to invest in
and contributing to the management of the companies post
investment. If this is the case, can the superior perfor-
mance of VC funded companies be attributed to the supe-
rior ability of VC firms to identify promising investments?
That is, are VCs able to identify, before investment, the
firms that would be able to achieve superior performance?
Or, can the superior performance be attributed to the value
addition and managerial inputs that VCs provide to their
portfolio companies after investment? That is, the subse-
quent superior performance stems not from the ability to
pick winners, but by the ability to ensure that the firm is
managed well post investment.
Previous studies have documented the extent of
involvement of VC investors in their portfolio companies.
Gorman and Sahlman (1989) using survey data indicate that
VCs are actively engaged in both selection and management
activities.
Value addition to the portfolio companies is an impor-
tant feature of VC investment and one which distinguishes
it from other sources of funds. Previous research (see for
example, Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; MacMillan et al., 1989;
Rosenstein, 1988; Rosenstein, Bruno, Bygrave, & Taylor,
1989; Sapienza & Timmons, 1989; Hellmann & Puri, 2002)
gives an understanding of the involvement of VCs in the
portfolio companies after investment.
Selection vs value addition
Baum and Silverman (2004) try and answer these questions
by analysing the companies in the biotechnology industry
in Canada. They study whether the characteristics that
attract VC funding such as alliances, intellectual and
human capital (top management) are also associated with
future performance after the investment. The results
indicate that alliances and intellectual property have
a similar effect on attracting VC investment and subsequent
firm performance. However, human capital or top
management characteristics of the firm that was associated
with VC investment had little effect on subsequent firm
performance. This suggests a combination of both the
selection and value addition roles in influencing portfolio
company performance. VCs are able to select companies
that have strong technology and relationships, but those
that are at an increased risk of short term failure. They
then provide management inputs that enhance the longterm survival of the firm and contribute to superior
performance.
Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) try and address the
selection vs value addition issueby studying the performance
of syndicated VC investments. Syndication is often observed
in VC investments, when more than one VC investor jointly
makes an investment in the company. Risk diversification and
the inability to fund a larger investment size are often
considered the reasons for syndication among VC investors.
Brander et al. indicate that syndication is often seen even
when the capital requirements of the venture are modest as
compared to funds managed by the VC investor. They
therefore propose that syndication happens because it
improves selection and value addition. VCs syndicate
because two or more independent investors can screen
projects more effectively than one. If an investment
opportunity is brought to the VCs, and if the assessment is
very positive, then the VCs would accept the project straight
away. If the assessment is very low, then the opportunity is
rejected outright. There is no value for a second opinion in
both the cases. On the other hand, if the initial assessment is
in between, a second opinion from another investor can be
valuable. The authors therefore propose that the most
promising opportunities would be taken up without any
syndication, while those that offer moderate promise would
be syndicated. They therefore test for the hypothesis that
non-syndicated investments should on average yield higher
returns than syndicated projects. If improved selection is the
central motivation for syndication, it follows that syndicated
investments should have lower returns than non-syndicated
investments.
Similarly, different VCs have different skills and infor-
mation and the value addition improves if investors with
complementary capabilities can add value to the portfolio
company. Since syndication involves sharing of benefits
among different investors, VCs would engage in syndication
only when benefit cost ratio of syndication is favourable. If
the value addition hypothesis dominates then the returns
should be higher for syndicated investments. Using the data
collected from Canadian VC investments, Brander et al.
indicated that syndicated investments have significantly
higher returns than non-syndicated investments. Therefore
they infer that the value addition hypothesis drives the
rationale for syndication over the selection hypothesis and
suggest that management rather than selection contributes
to the success of VC investments.
More recently, Chemmanur et al. (2009) use the Longi-
tudinal Research Database of the US Census Bureau to study
questions related to efficiency gains in VC investment. They
use Total Factor Productivity (TFP), i.e., the residual
growth in output after accounting for changes in production
factors as a measure to analyse the efficiency of portfolio
firms. They find that the efficiency of VC backed firms prior
to receiving VC funding is higher than that of non VC backed
firms. Further, the growth in efficiency after receiving VC
financing is greater for VC backed firms as compared to the
growth of non VC backed firms. This indicates the evidence
for both screening/selection and the value addition role for
VCs in improving firm efficiency. They however find that the
contribution due to monitoring and value addition accounts
for a higher proportion of the increases in profits in VC
funded companies (21% of the increases in profits are due to
Anchor
Thillai Rajan A.
Panellists
Ramesh Emani, Co-Founder and CEO, Insta Health
Solutions. ramesh.emani@instahealthsolutions.com
Samir Kumar, Managing Director, Inventus Advisory
Services (I) Pvt. Ltd. samir@inventuscap.com
G Sabarinathan, Associate Professor, Finance and Control,
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. sabari@iimb.
ernet.in
190 A. Thillai Rajanscreening effects and 35% of the increases in profits are due
to monitoring effects). They are also able to find that
contribution to portfolio firm efficiencies differ between
high and low reputation VCs. While the TFP of firms prior to
VC financing was higher for low reputation VC backed firms,
the growth in TFP subsequent to financing was higher for
firms backed by high reputation VCs. Their results suggest
that while low reputation VCs rely on selecting more effi-
cient firms, high reputation VCs are better able to improve
the efficiency of the firms they invest in.
Fitza, Matusik, and Mosakowski (2009) try and address
the same question in a governance context, by modelling
the relationship between the VC and portfolio companies
analogous to that of the relationship between a corporation
and its business units. They study the impact of owners
(VCs) and the contribution of VCs to variation in firm
performance. They find that while portfolio company
specific effects accounted for 26.3% of the variation, VC
effects accounted for the next highest percentage of vari-
ation (11.2%). They also find that the VC investor is not
a statistically significant predictor of the variance in port-
folio company performance during the first round of
investment and performance variance attributable to VCs
appeared to occur after the initial round of VC investing
and not before. Some VCs provided a high value added
(estimated at 19% over at least 10 investments), while
others appeared to destroy value (estimated at 18% over
at least 10 investments). This suggests that VCs may be
similar to each other when it comes to choosing invest-
ments, but differ in terms of their ability to add value after
they have made the investment.
Sørensen (2007), on the other hand, provides a contrary
finding to the studies stated earlier. He finds that the effect
of selection exceeds that of management. However, the
limitation of this finding is that his study was based on
identifying only one lead investor per portfolio company
investment without considering the significance of multiple
investors, some of whom are in a better position to select
rather than manage their portfolio companies.Guhan Subramaniam, Managing Partner, IL&FS Investment
Managers Ltd. Guhan.Subramaniam@ilfsindia.comSummary
Evidence indicates that VC funded companies perform
better than comparative companies that are not VC funded.
Research has indicated that significant variance in perfor-
mance between them can be attributed to the VC investor.
This then led to the subsequent questiondwhat capabil-
ities of VCs contribute to the performance variation. There
has been more research evidence to indicate that mana-
gerial and value addition capabilities of VCs dominate the
selection capabilities in explaining the performance
variation.
More research is needed for further insights on the
contribution of VC to the efficiency and performance of
portfolio companies. Specifically, I would like to highlight
two areas that need further research. First, further studies
are needed to analyse the attribution of the managerial
inputs and resources (‘the carrot’) that VCs bring vis-a-vis the
result of disciplining force (‘the stick’) that they impose upon
portfolio companies in explaining theperformance variation.
VCs structure their investments in such a way so that most ofthe business and financial risk is borne by the entrepreneur.
Some of the tools used to discipline the investee companies
are staged investments (where the VCs retain the right to
stop further funding to thefirm), useof convertible preferred
stock (instead of straight equity, which gives the VCs senior
claim over that of entrepreneurs and a set of enforceable
covenants in case of poor performance of the firm) and the
right to replace the management team, when the firm does
not do well (Sahlman, 1990).
Second, the effect of context on how VCs contribute to
the efficiency of portfolio companies needs to be studied
further. Most studies on this topic are based on data from
the developed countries, primarily the US. While the VC
industry has developed significantly in the recent years in
many emerging countries like India, the profile of the VCs in
these countries is different from those seen in developed
countries. For example, many VCs in India are from the
financing and investment banking industry and do not have
substantial technology or business experience. Further
research needs to be done whether such contextual
differences impacts the way VCs contribute to the effi-
ciency of their portfolio companies.Venture capital and efficiency of portfolio
companies: DiscussionThillai Rajan: The contribution of VCs to the efficiency of
portfolio companies has long been a topic of interest to the
research community. The preceding part the paper
provides a perspective of academic research on this topic.
The main objective of this round table discussion is to
reflect on this topic in the context of practice. The Indian
VC industry has clocked the fastest growth rate globally in
recent years and the country has emerged as one of the
leading destinations for VC investments. However, research
on the Indian VC industry has been limited. We hope that
this round table would not only provide a practitioner
perspective on the topic but also contribute to the litera-
ture on the Indian VC industry.
We have four panel members joining us for the discus-
sion this afternoon. Samir Kumar, Managing Director at
Inventus Advisory Services, has been an early stage investor
in India for the past nine years. Prior to co-founding
Inventus, he led the India venture team for Acer Tech
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years in the IT industry in India. Guhan Subramaniam is
a Managing Partner at IL&FS Investment Managers Limited.
As past colleagues at IL&FS, we have worked together. He
has more than 10 years of private equity experience across
the complete investment cycle. Prior to joining IL&FS
Investment Managers, Guhan has had 22 years of opera-
tional experience in senior management roles with leading
corporations. Ramesh Emani is a co-founder and the CEO of
Insta Health Solutions Private Limited. Insta Health is
engaged in providing IT solutions for medium and large size
hospitals. Prior to starting Insta Health, Ramesh was the
president of the Telecom and Product Engineering Solutions
division at Wipro Technologies. G Sabarinathan is an Asso-
ciate Professor in the Finance and Control Area at the
Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, where he
teaches the first year MBA core course in Corporate
Finance. Prior to joining academia, he had long experience
in managing VC funds and served on the boards of over
thirty firms across a number of industries.
Motivation for value creation: Samir Kumar
Let me begin with a small introduction. Inventus is a $52
million fund, and invests in early stage companies. By early
stage, I mean Inventus is usually the first institutional
investor in the company. Like most VCs we raise capital
from institutional investors, who are looking for opportu-
nities to multiply their capital. Therefore, while people
tend to associate broader objectives like employment
generation and new technology with VC investments, VCs
are very strongly focused on achieving large financial
returns from their investments.
My presentation is structured in two parts: the charac-
teristics that VCs look for when they make an investment
decision, and the value they add to their portfolio compa-
nies. The main factors the VCs look for can be classified into
four categories. First, they look for a great entrepreneurial
team. Ultimately, VCs invest in the people behind the idea,
and therefore team composition and capabilities are an
important factor for any VC. Second, they look for large and
fast growing markets. The markets have to be large,
because it becomes difficult to exit from companies that
are small. Third, VCs look for a differentiated value prop-
osition. For a company to create value, it is important that
it is not seen as a me-too player in the market. Fourth, VCs
look for the feasibility of exit opportunities, such as initial
public offerings (IPOs) or mergers and acquisitions (M&As).
VCs need to give back the capital along with the returns to
their investors at the end of fund life, and they would not
be able to generate returns and give back the capital if they
are not able to exit from their investments.
Since VCs invest in equity capital, they do not have
guaranteed returns on their investment. While their
investments can theoretically have an unlimited upside,
they are also sometimes forced to write off their invest-
ments. Therefore, in their self interest, to maximise the
returns from an investment, VCs add value to their portfolio
companies. They add value in multiple ways. As board
members, they work closely with the entrepreneur, acting
as sounding boards and providing strategic advice to the
entrepreneur. The investors use their networks to help thecompanies in customer introductions, hire key people or to
engage with partners. They also add value during the exit
process, and help in identifying investment bankers and in
successfully presenting the company to the investors.
Potential areas for value addition: Guhan
Subramaniam
In a way, the VC is also an entrepreneur. VCs use their
competence, skills, and experience for efficient deployment
of funds with the objective of maximising returns for their
investor. Themoney that VCs bring to the table is often called
smartmoney (to differentiate it fromwhat onewould term as
dumbmoney) because inaddition to themonetarycapital that
VCs bring to the table, they also bring intellectual capital and
relationship capital. In a sense they actively create an eco
systemthroughbuildingand leveraginganetworkof investors,
industry forums, business and thought leaders, investment
banks, audit and legal firms, to the advantage of the fund
managers (general partners), investors (limited partners) and
the portfolio companies.
At the beginning of the relationship between the VC and
a portfolio company, the notion of value addition is nebulous
or abstract. As the relationship builds the perceived needs of
the enterprise and the potential ability of the investor to
contribute take a more distinct form and shape. There are
many areas where VCs can potentially add value to an
enterprise. For example, as Samir mentioned, VCs act as
sounding boards for validation of concepts, strategies,
markets and business plans. More definitively, VCs mentor
the CXOs and senior management. Depending on the profile
of the VC partner associated with an enterprise, VCs can
provide domain expertise. VCs ensure that the portfolio
companies adopt effective systems and processes. In recent
years, irrespective of the size of the enterprise, there has
been a focus on corporate governance. This has been rele-
vant to early stage companies also because these practices
can be difficult to change at a later stage. VCs contribute to
the senior management pool e they are able to identify,
interview, negotiate and recruit senior management talent
for the portfolio company. VCs also help to attract other co-
investors to the firm. Amost critical value add from a VC is in
enabling a liquidity event such as an IPO or Strategic Merger/
Acquisition. Large PE/VC investors have a network and in
depth understanding of the capital markets. So, if the
company wants to list in an IPO, it becomes critical to have
the right merchant banker and the ability to value the
company correctly. VCs also help in building momentum and
managing capital markets during the IPO process.
Value addition by the VCs is not to be seen as charity
work. Such value addition directly contributes to the
valuation multiple at exit. In sum, VCs do not wave a magic
wand and cast a spell on the enterprise. They can provide
specific value adds which they understand and can deliver
to meet the relevant needs articulated by an enterprise.Contributing to growth: Ramesh Emani
Before starting my current venture, I worked with Wipro
Technologies for about 25 years. I started with a $1 million
192 A. Thillai Rajantarget, and when I left, I was running a $1 billion business.
I have therefore had the opportunity to experience the
strengths of a very large and well run company like Wipro.
In my current venture, I interact with small and medium
hospitals, which can be classified as small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). I am also in the board of two other small
companies. This has given me an exposure to how small
companies work. When I contrast this with the experience
that I had at Wipro, I can broadly think of three areas where
small companies need help to grow.
First, they need capital. Small companies are inherently
more risky than large companies and they need adequate
capital to manage those risks appropriately. In the Indian
context, apart from the promoters’ own capital, there are
not many other sources of capital for small businesses apart
from VC. Therefore at a basic level, VCs contribute to the
growth of the small company by providing capital.
Second, they need expertise. Unlike large companies,
small companies do not have substantial functional exper-
tise. Apart from the founders and a couple of other senior
members, there would be few others within the organisa-
tion who would have significant functional expertise.
Therefore, they are compelled to get this expertise from
outside. The best people to provide such expertise would
be the investors in the company. While others can act as
mentors, or even become board members, it is the investor
who is well positioned to provide such expertise because
the performance of the company is intertwined with the
financial returns to the investor. Many VC investors have
prior industry experience and are therefore well equipped
to advise the companies in different functional areas. They
are also well networked and well informed because of their
active participation in various industry forums.
Third, small companies benefit from what can be called
‘positive pressure’. Many entrepreneurs start their business
because they want to be independent. Therefore, many of
them are not able to decide whether they want to grow or
be content with the existing level of operations. Even when
they want to grow, they sometimes do not make the right
decisions that would help them to grow. It is here that a VC
investment helps. Because of their own exit pressures, VCs
bring in a sense of urgency and positive pressure on
achieving performance and growth.
In sum, VCs add a lot of value to their portfolio
companies. VC funded companies should have dispropor-
tionate success as compared to companies that are
completely funded by promoters.1 Examples of publications include Sahlman’s 1990 paper,
Clayton, Gambill, & Harned, 1999 article, and Gompers and
Lerner’s 2001 publication.Levers of value creation: G Sabarinathan
There are multiple ways in which we could look at the
question of efficiency. In financial markets literature, effi-
ciency is generally defined as the excess returns over
a benchmark such as the market returns. However, since
many VC investments are in unlisted companies, financial
returns may not always present a reasonable picture of
efficiency. Therefore, many have looked at the operational
efficiency of portfolio companies. One of the problems in
looking at operational efficiency is in measurement. For
example, it becomes difficult to measure the inputs that
constitute the so called value addition process. VCinvestment happens in a highly unregulated setting, and
there are no reporting or disclosure requirements. A lot of
the inputs that VCs provide are never documented either by
the VC or the company. These happen in private conver-
sations for a variety of reasons. Another issue with value
creation is what can be called the ‘post hoc, ergo propter
hoc’ problem. Many believe that returns follow inputs of
value addition and therefore when returns occur they are
construed as the outcome of value addition. But it is diffi-
cult to prove the cause and effect relationship. Most often,
the returns might have happened in spite of value addition.
However, as it happens, value addition is an important
concept in practice, as VCs often position their post
financing involvement as a strategic differentiator from
competing funds. While academic literature often tends to
look at value creation universally across funds, in reality
styles of VC involvement vary across funds and the stage of
evolution of the portfolio company. Value addition also
varies between angel investors, VCs and private equity
investors. While the line of distinction between these
categories of investors is fairly thin in the Indian context,
traditionally, each of these investors approach value addi-
tion very differently. Most of the existing academic litera-
ture on value addition dates back to the late 80s or early
90s. From my understanding of the industry, the value
addition practices have changed a lot since then. Therefore
it becomes important to study the subject of value addition
with some of the current practices in the industry.
Previous speakers have spoken about what VCs do to
create value. I would like to talk a little about how they do
it. The academic literature on early stage or VC financing
emphasises the importance of staged financing. While
practitioners see this as a matter of routine, academics
have attached a lot of importance to staged financing1.
Staged financing is an important part of how VCs actually
bring value addition and it is one of the levers they use in
the value addition process. Some of the other levers that
VCs use to create value include board representation in the
portfolio company, use of covenants, and engagement with
the portfolio companies at the operational level.
Finally, I would also like to add that networking among
VCs and the reputation of the entrepreneur also play an
important role. VCs are a small community and are well
networked. If an earlier investor feels that the entrepre-
neur has been dishonest or fractious, then word gets around
to other VC investors, and it becomes very difficult for the
entrepreneur to raise subsequent VC funding. VCs thus add
value by creating a sense of discipline among the
entrepreneurs.
Discussion
Thillai Rajan: Academic literature reveals that by and large
VC funded companies have shown superior performance to
non VC funded companies. The question then is, how much
of the superior performance can be attributed to VCs given
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companies. Is superior performance then a result of the
inherent characteristics of the firm or do VCs contribute
after they have entered into the firm?
Samir Kumar: The answer is, both. Some would argue
that the top quartile VC firms because of their reputation
get the best entrepreneurs and therefore the companies
funded by these firms are inherently superior and therefore
they perform better. But I would not completely subscribe
to that view point. I think some of the top quartile
companies have a special network that comes into play for
their portfolio companies that gives them better access to
customers, better exits, and better partnership opportu-
nities. Therefore, the VCs definitely contribute to the
performance of their portfolio companies. If I have to put
a number, I would say that about 50e60% of the superior
performance of VC funded firms could be attributed to the
inherent qualities of the firms that the VCs fund and the
remaining 40e50% of the performance could be attributed
to value addition by VCs. The systems, processes, gover-
nance and reporting that we make mandatory, play a role in
the performance differential.
Since I invest in early stage companies, I can say that the
processes that we help put in place play a role in the
success of early stage companies.
G Sabarinathan: The answer is contextual. Many VCs
believethat theirwork reallybeginsafter thechequehasbeen
signed and handed over; therefore selection is not the major
thing. My trouble is with the belief that VCs play a role in the
success of their portfolio companies. Though VCs may act in
the best interests of the company it is very hard to prove that
they have affected the outcome positively. Most successful
VCs would probably endorse this view as well. Gorman &
Sahlman’s 1989 paper looked at a matched sample of
companies and investors and interviewed them on the
perceived importance of what the VC thought he did to the
portfolio company and onwhat the entrepreneur perceived it
to be, and the perceived importance of what the VC thought
he should do to the company and that of what the entrepre-
neur thought he should do. The research revealed a huge
difference between the perceptions of the two. Further, the
measurement and methodology issues come into focus when
oneconsiders theaspectofattribution.Evencasestudieshave
limitations when it comes to teasing out these nuances.
Guhan Subramaniam: In a typical VC fund, the portfolio
consists of anywhere between 10 and 15 companies, of
which only about 25e30% of the companies perform well. In
terms of value addition, the VCs do not neglect any
company in the portfolio to start with. The contribution is
the same for all companies in the portfolio. More often than
not, the involvement of the VCs, at least in terms of time
spent, is a lot more with companies that have gone down
without a whimper than with companies that have achieved
a huge return. This leads me to believe that the intrinsic
factors such as a competent management team, con-
ceptualising, positioning and delivering a value proposition,
being in the right marketplace at the right time, and
a buoyant economy become critical issues for a company to
succeed besides the VCs value addition. VC’s value addition
alone is no substitute for success or increased efficiencies.
Ramesh Emani: I often tell entrepreneurs to go for VC
funding only to make sure that somebody else also believesin their story. It is like an endorsement, a good benchmark
process, so that people will not embark on a foolhardy
business. Secondly, the part played by the VC is similar to
that of the audit firms and sometimes even that played by
the board. VCs can help in identifying and addressing the
shortcomings but they might not be able to contribute
much in terms of adding to the positives. Addressing the
negatives will make sure the company will not fail but it is
addressing the positives that is essential for success. The
reason is VCs are not as familiar with the business as the
entrepreneurs are and usually do not have in depth
understanding of the product, customer or the technology.
When the VCs have good understanding of the business then
they can contribute to the value addition process. For
example, a VC investor like Vinod Khosla can contribute to
his investments in the communications technology sector
given his business experience.
Thillai Rajan: The viewpoints that have emerged are
quite interesting and in a way contrasting to the findings in
academic literature, which are largely based on the expe-
rience of the developed countries. Most empirical literature
has indicated that the value addition effect dominates the
selection effect in accounting for the increased efficiency
of the VC funded companies. However, the views of the
panel members seem to indicate that the absence of such
a dominance of the value addition effect, and if at all there
is a dominance, it could be the selection effect. One of the
reasons for this could be the background of the VC investors
operating in India. I’d like Samir and Guhan to address this
point e You work in different spectrums as far as invest-
ment is concerned. Can we go to the next level and see how
you are involved with your portfolio companies as early
stage and late stage investors respectively?
Guhan Subramaniam: My experience says that between
the VC and the portfolio company there is a stage where
you are building trust; the investor is being evaluated as
much as the investee. Some entrepreneurs are clear that
they do not want a high level of interference. Every
entrepreneur has a dream much beyond wealth creation,
and in the process of achieving his dream there could be
conflicts between him and the VC on varied issues from
choice of technology to target markets. It is important that
we avoid conflicts in the early stage and understand what is
expected by the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs may want
inputs in specific areas. So the initial process of identifying
where VCs could contribute and the extent of contribution
should be sorted out first. For instance, VCs without the
requisite technological knowledge could focus more on
contributing to the financial aspects of the portfolio
company. VCs cannot add value to every aspect of the
business; I have found that sometimes it might be best to
step aside and do nothing until asked. Value addition should
not be thrust upon companies; the need has to be felt and it
has to be asked for.
To address your query, contribution to a portfolio
company will vary based on the stage of investment and the
profile of the investor. PE/VC investors making investments
in growth stage companies would be focused on enabling
companies build strategic relationships, strengthening the
management team and leadership, enlarging the composi-
tion of the board, leveraging changes in statutory policies,
financial optimisation, and so on.
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investors. One, who understand the industry so well that
they figure out the idea and put a team around the idea to
implement it. Typically these teams are entrepreneurs
whom the VC investors have backed before, and who are
now being backed in subsequent firms. The second type,
into which we (and many Indian VCs) fall, believe in backing
entrepreneurs who are following their dream. We have no
great knowledge of the industry, the market or the
customers and we think the entrepreneur knows much more
about these things and if we think he has a plausible story,
we back him.
Adding to what Ramesh Emani said, another area where
early stage investors could contribute in is the elimination
of negatives, which in itself is a huge positive, and it is one
thing we are called to do time and time again. We do not go
in with a preconceived notion of what value to add, but the
value that we add depends on a specific company, and is
different in different situations.
In the Indian context, many VC investors have transi-
tioned to become private equity investors. The reason
behind this transition could be that VC investment needs
different skill sets. It needs skill sets of people coming from
prior experience in business operations. Unlike investors
with a background in investment banking or lending,
investors with an operating experience are able to under-
stand the needs of an entrepreneur and are able to add real
value to an entrepreneur.
I will close with an example from the other side. I worked
for a while with a startup which was funded by a prominent
VC firm. As Head of AsiaPac, when I visited their Hong Kong
office and explained the nature of our products and the sort
of help we wanted, they promised me a meeting with the
head of the customer organisation, when the person I really
wanted to meet and who would be useful to my sales effort
was several levels below the head. Finally, nothing resulted
from that request. So when we started as a VC investor, I was
very clear that value addition should not be thought of in
grandiose terms, but as a way of doing several small things
which cumulatively make a big difference.
Thillai Rajan: The discussion on the two broad cate-
gories of VCs is interesting. In the first, which is commonly
seen in the West, the VCs have a strong understanding of
the technology and business space. In the second type,
which is more often seen in India, the VCs may not have
as good an understanding of the business as the entrepre-
neur. Therefore, in India, entrepreneurs play a central
role in the funded companies and investors rely more on
the management of the portfolio company. Contrastingly,
in developed countries we have heard stories where the VCs
often replace the top management team in the portfolio
company if the performance is poor.
G Sabarinathan: The belief that VCs replace CEOs and
top management is exaggerated. Academic research
establishes that it doesn’t happen as often as people think
it does. The evidence on the effectiveness of this step is
very mixed. In the Indian context, I believe that (and as
a former practitioner) a lot of what you do is defined by the
administrative jurisdiction within which you conduct busi-
ness. The state plays an important part in the way business
is conducted in emerging markets, whether it is related to
governance or structuring or the way you write contracts ein India there is a significant ‘Indianness’ that creeps in into
all aspects. Many covenants that are a part of a standard VC
investment agreement can be difficult to enforce in India.
For example, it becomes difficult to enforce a ‘drag-along’
or a ‘tag-along’ clause in India; the courts simply will not
recognise them as they are considered inequitable. Simi-
larly, the courts have never enforced a buy back clause that
is often found in VC investment agreements. Yet we have
all these agreements, which some people say exist for
‘moral suasion’.
Samir Kumar: I agree with Prof Sabarinathan on the
changing of the CEO. If you are changing the CEO it means
that you have a failed investment that you are trying to
salvage. The fact is that you have an entrepreneurial team
which is pursuing a dream and it is very hard to substitute
it. May be at a later stage, when the company has evolved
and become profitable, with the consent of the entrepre-
neurial team you could bring in a seasoned CEO who would
take it to the next level. But not in the first few years.
Guhan Subramaniam: Today, for a startup, an entre-
preneur is a person who is passionate about technology that
he believes will succeed. What this leads to, especially with
early stage investments is that VC firms look at the entre-
preneur’s idea and the management team around the idea
while making the investment. Somewhere midway the VC
firm realises that while the entrepreneur is very passionate
about the technology, he is not a good manager; the firm
needs somebody who can manage cash effectively, be
assertive and manage well with clear milestones. These are
things which seem to escape when the investment is made
initially. We are able to see these hurdles only half way
down, and hence the need to induct a professional, an
experienced CEO to lead the business instead of the
entrepreneur. The downside is that the company may not
be able to attract another CEO, as prospective CEO candi-
dates may consider such a development as interference by
VCs, and it might be viewed unfavourably. While change of
CEOs does not happen often, when it needs to be done, we
should have the courage to go ahead and do it.
Thillai Rajan: Ramesh, as an entrepreneur could you
reflect on the topic of value addition and how it influenced
your choice of investor? Before that, could you also share
the reasons why you chose to go for VC financing? We know
that there are a lot of conditionalities associated with a VC
investment e you have to dilute your shareholding, if things
don’t go well you could be subjected to extra monitoring,
and so on.
Ramesh Emani: For an entrepreneur in the technology
and services sector, there are limited sources of capital.
Either you put in your own money or you take money from
friends and family. Even in the developed country markets
there are no other institutions other than VCs to raise
money. The draconian clauses or the drag-along and tag-
along clauses do not really matter because you know that if
you fail, you fail as a company to deliver certain results and
you will have to exit. People, even outside India, do not
seem very troubled by these considerations. What troubles
entrepreneurs about VCs is when they are forced to merge
with somebody else. This happens when the company is not
doing very well but is not doing badly either. The opinion of
the investor and the VC may differ; when you have
completed three or four years and have not reached your
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CEO or mergers may arise and opinions may differ.
In selecting a VC investor, if you don’t have a choice you
would go with whoever is willing to put up the money. But,
assuming one has a choice, it is the comfort level that is the
consideration. Because the VCs are in some sense an
extension of the management, they are part of the team,
and therefore it is important that you recognise the level of
comfort with the investor. In my case, I have known my
investor for a long time and we had worked in the same
organisation earlier. But when I advise many young entre-
preneurs who might not have the advantage of knowing the
investor like we did, I tell them that personal comfort with
the investor is very important because they are an
extended part of your team.
Audience: You haven’t talked much about failure. Are
failing companies easier to spot or do they take you by
surprise? The issue of predictability e is it different with
companies that eventually fail as opposed to the winners?
Guhan Subramaniam: It is a documented fact that no
more than 30% of the companies in a portfolio really give
you expected returns. So we do build in failure into our
scheme of things right at the beginning. Despite the fail-
safe system, failures in a portfolio e both predictable and
surprises are not uncommon.
One of the key processes that VCs and private equity
firms perform is monitoring. We have a fairly rigid moni-
toring system in terms of information on performance that
goes much beyond the statutory requirements of a board
meeting. Effective monitoring does throw up a pattern, to
indicate companies that may not succeed. Monitoring also
results in a more productive discussion in terms of proactive
initiatives such as a change in strategy. Those are things
that even the management team at the entrepreneur’s end
would welcome and we would take some collective action
on strategies. In case of unexpected failures, such as
a company banking on creating a particular IP which is
rendered irrelevant by a sudden shift in technology, that
would result in sudden death.
Audience: Taking off from there, is the existing VC model
the right one? Could it be improved upon? There are newer
models such as the Y Combinatormodel, where the emphasis
is not on monetary support but a lot of non-monetary assis-
tance that smaller companies require. Such newer models
seem to be more successful than the normal VC models. Are
the traditional VC investment models being challenged?
Samir Kumar: In the early stage model, it is less about
money and more about time, which is why I made the point
of the importance of the operating background. In the US,
firms became larger and larger with fees being the driving
force e that model is broken. What that model led to in
early stage venture was VCs deploying more capital than
the company needed, which resulted in higher valuations
and lower returns. This led to a return to the smaller fund
model, the rise of micro VCs and super angels, all of which
are new terms for the old fashioned VC. These are funds in
the range of $100 e $200 million, deploying up to $5 million
in the early stages, but spending a lot of time with the
portfolio companies and trying to get better returns.
Guhan Subramaniam: The VC industry is now 60 years
old and the model has been tweaked over a period of time
which is why we see avatars like super angels, micro VCsand so on. However, risk investment is something that is not
going away. Any good idea that requires implementation
will require support in terms of funds and that will be
a pure risk model as opposed to a debt funding model. The
business model or expectations could change but I don’t see
the VC industry per se going away because it fulfills a very
critical purpose.
Ramesh Emani: There are several small companies and
they need management intervention or advice rather than
money. In a country like India this is a fairly large segment
which is presently being underserved. Institutions like IIM
can take up research projects on the market scope for such
interventions, the introduction of technology to improve
such processes and systems. There are several companies
that are in the Rs 10e20 crores (100e200 million) range,
including ITES companies whose managements are happy
that they are making money but they do not have the
strength or the preparedness to sustain adverse winds. So if
institutional mechanisms can be created which are not
investment fund oriented but management oriented there
is a lot of scope for it in a country like India which has
a huge list of SMEs.
Thillai Rajan: Given that India requires a lot of funding
for entrepreneurship particularly at the early stage, what
should be the contours of the VC model particularly as we
go forward. Our model is still US-centric. Can we evolve
a model that would more relevant to the Indian context?
Ramesh Emani: Entrepreneurs’ issues are the same all
over, especially when it comes to investments to run the
company. Companies need funds and advice and both are
difficult to get. The IT industry may be different because it
evolved differently. There are several industries and
sectors in India, such as healthcare, education or even the
corner grocery store, which do not get the attention of VCs
today. Healthcare and education are the largest employing
industries, outside of the government e these are examples
of SME dominated industries which require intervention,
both funds and advice; today their only source of financing
is banks. By developing India-centric models, we would be
able to target these sectors for VC funding. We may have to
follow the example of Germany, where one can see a large
number of SME’s like in India. Over the years, Germany has
successfully developed a financial system to meet the
needs of SMEs.
Samir Kumar: From the VC standpoint, what we have to
see happening in India which is different from the US is
smaller funds. And those who are partners in smaller funds
will have to live with smaller fees. We need to have LPs
from India providing VC funds. Overseas LPs have a very
different view towards portfolio companies. Hopefully,
Indian LPs will have a better understanding of the situation
and enable VCs to invest in companies that will create real
value. These are the two things that need to happen.
G Sabarinathan: The current VC fund model consists of
two sets of relationships: one that exists between the
limited partner and the VC fund manager, and the second
that exists between the fund manager and the portfolio
company. Academic research has segmented the VC field
into these two sets of agency relationships. The first set of
relationships seems to be replicated fairly successfully
across market contexts universally e its key aspects being
incentive systems, governance mechanisms, performance
196 A. Thillai Rajanmeasurement and allocation strategy. It has been repli-
cated in the Indian context as well.
It is in the second component that the AngloeSaxon
approach to governance may not apply universally to all
jurisdictional contexts ea 2010 paper by Cappelli et al.
(2010) argues that there is an Indian approach to
managing business which is distinctly different from the
handededown AngloeSaxon approach. Fund managers may
need to take cognisance of this. So while there is no need to
tweak the first component of the relationship, in the
second component, an Indian model is evolving and VCs
may need to relate to their portfolio companies differently
and also educate their overseas partners.
Guhan Subramaniam: Looking ahead, while it is true
that early stage funding is drying up and there is less and
less of venture capital in India, the funds are becoming
sector specific. Today it is not unusual to meet investors
who focus only on healthcare or education or technology.
At the same time, the restructuring of the industry is being
driven by need and compulsion. We could draw a parallel
with microfinance. The success of microfinance evolved
from the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and it has currently
become a hot favourite with the large institutional inves-
tors in the US. Microfinance has been able to raise a lot
more money and that was a response to a situation when
80% of the community could not really access debt from
the more structured institutions such as commercial banks.
I think something similar may happen in this industry
because today the difference between venture capital and
private equity is more in terms of the size and stage of
investment. The structure would throw up a new business
model where we would find that VC is back with a lot more
of early stage funding. There will be innovation of business
models in this industry.
Thillai Rajan: Our discussion has highlighted that the
context as well as backgrounds of the VCs can influence the
way VCs contribute to the efficiency of their portfolio
companies. Thank you all for your inputs and for this very
interesting and insightful discussion.
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